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Abstract 
The Residential Aged Care (RAC) Sector in Australia is significant in terms of the ageing 
population (consistent with most developed countries), and the fact that it will affect the 
majority of the population in terms of the need for RAC at some stage in their lives. Having 
access to information for stakeholders to make informed and timely decisions regarding the 
comparison of RAC providers is often difficult due to there being higher demand than supply, 
small timeframe to make decisions with a high emotional content and the difficulty in 
changing providers. Information was gathered from the RAC provider's website, reports and 
other publicly available information, to determine their level of governance disclosure, over a 
three year period. It was found that the RAC providers should not just be limited to their legal 
reporting requirements (mandatory), but instead should also endeavour to disclose additional 
voluntary information, in order for their stakeholders to make informed decisions. In 
addressing the Australian RAC Sector's stakeholder governance information needs, a 
governance framework (RAC Sector Governance Framework) and the G-CARD 
(Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure) Model were developed for this sector to 
improve governance disclosure. This research provides new insights and a basis for further 
research to determine whether the Australian RAC Sector have improved their consistency 
and adequacy of their governance disclosure through the use of the proposed G-CARD 
Model and associated framework. 
 
Keywords: Governance, Stakeholder Theory, RAC Governance Framework, G-CARD 
Model 
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1.0 Introduction 
Consistent with most developed countries, Australia has an ageing population (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2010). In most developed countries, this trend is predominantly 
due to declining mortality, and sustained low fertility rates. Nearly one in every seven 
Australians is aged 65 or over (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2011). 
This presents the challenge for communities and governments of increasing demand for 
formal care services for the aged (Borowski & McDonald, 2007). Australia’s Aged Care 
System consists of three core service streams: residential care, community care, and flexible 
care (AIHW, 2012). Residential Aged Care (RAC) is ‘personal and/or nursing care provided 
to a person in a residential care service in which the person is also provided with 
accommodation that includes meals, cleaning services, furniture and equipment’ (AIHW, 
2012, p.76). Community care (The Community Aged Care Packages Program) assists older 
people residing in their own homes, by providing services including home nursing, assistance 
with meals, shopping, bathing, and transport (ABS, 2010).  
Flexible care services provide a mixture of residential and community care services, such as 
the Transition Care Program and the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Flexible 
Aged Care program (ABS, 2008; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision (SCRGSP), 2013). The main providers of RAC services are Not-for-Profit (NFP) 
(60%), private (30%) and government (10%) organisations. Overall, the NFP sector 
(dominated by religious organisations) is the largest provider. Individual facilities are also 
growing larger, with 45% offering over 60 places and 6% offering less than 20 places 
(AIHW, 2012a). 
This research focuses on the governance information RAC providers disclose to decision-
makers and whether this information meets their needs. Information disclosure is vital for the 
‘efficient functioning of markets’ (Bayoud, 2012, p.76). A lack of information disclosure can 
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result in information asymmetry (IA). IA exists when one group has an information 
advantage over another. Information plays a vital role in decision-making informed by public 
(freely available) and private information (that only available, if at all, to limited audiences). 
Information that managers disclose to the market decreases IA (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006). 
This research will allow RAC providers and their stakeholders to consider the current level of 
governance disclosure required and the level of voluntary disclosures providers in the sector 
choose to disclose; and whether this level of disclosure is adequate for stakeholders to make 
informed decisions. 
Corporate governance has become an essential element of the corporate environment. 
However, there has been little research on such reporting in the context of the RAC sector in 
Australia. Significantly, this research aims to inform policy debates on minimum governance 
disclosures, and their impacts. This research may also lead to organisations reporting more 
relevant information to their stakeholders, in relation to their governance practices. This may 
further assist decision-makers as it may encourage more open and transparent governance 
disclosures. Better-informed decisions may act to facilitate more efficient Government 
funding allocation processes, potentially better addressing the demand and supply gaps in the 
RAC sector in Australia. 
 
2.0 Theoretical Background 
Stakeholder theory is both a positive and normative theory. Stakeholder theory requires 
management to “give equal consideration to the interests of all stakeholders and, when these 
interests conflict, manage the business so as to attain the optimal balance among them” 
(Deegan, 2003). A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievements of an organisation’s objectives” (Seetharaman, Subramanian & Shyong, 
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2005). An organisation’s stakeholders include employees, shareholders, suppliers, investors, 
customers, and government. Basically stakeholders are anyone who has a vested interest in 
the organisation or a right to obtain information about it (Dellaportas, Gibson, Alagiah, 
Hutchinson, Leung and Homrigh, 2005). The challenge for management is to try and meet 
these conflicting demands. Generally, the more important the stakeholder, the more important 
it is for the organisation to meet their demands (Deegan, 2003). 
Stakeholder theory has both an ethical or normative branch, and a managerial branch.  The 
ethical branch deliberates matters related with rights to material privileges that should be met 
irrespective of the influence of the stakeholders involved (Drever, Stanton & McGowan, 
2007). The managerial branch envisages the organisation will lean toward satisfying the 
information demands of those stakeholders who are imperative to its continuing survival 
(Drever, Stanton & McGowan, 2007). What a specific stakeholder demands and obtains 
depends upon how influential they are perceived to be, with power frequently measured in 
relation to the scarcity of the resources controlled via the stakeholders. ‘‘Disclosure of 
information is considered to represent an important strategy in managing stakeholders’’ 
(Deegan, 2004, p.278). 
 
Good corporate governance ensures organisations set appropriate objectives, have in place 
systems and structures to meet these objectives, and the means to control and monitor their 
activities and managers (OECD, 2015). According to the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) corporate governance is explained as follows: 
“The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation … and lays down 
the rules and procedures for decision-making. By doing this, it also provides the 
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structure through which the company objectives are set, and means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance”.  
Corporate governance rules are required because of the nature in which organisations are 
structured. With the exception of small family operated businesses, the people that contribute 
the resources to the business (capital investors, shareholders or lenders) do not directly 
manage the business (the separation of ownership from operational control). The corporate 
governance framework is primarily concerned with managing this relationship (Rankin,  
Stanton, McGowan, Ferlauto & Tilling, 2012).  
The mechanisms organisations employee to govern (direct and control), depends on the 
effectiveness of its structures and processes in place. Good corporate governance ensures 
organisations set appropriate objectives, have in place systems and structures to meet these 
objectives, and the means to control and monitor their activities and managers (OECD, 2015). 
Many countries in both the developing and developed world have established rules or 
descriptions of practices “that should be included in corporate governance systems” that form 
either recommendations or legal requirements, these include, for example                                                                         
China, the OECD, the United States, etc.  
By comparing each of the regimes we can combine them to see the differences and 
similarities in a variety of combinations and that in itself shows the lack of consistency when 
designing and applying corporate governance initiatives.  
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Table 1: Comparisons of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 ‘Protective’ 
Principles 
China Nordic 
Regions 
New 
Zealand 
OECD US UK AUS 
Governance 
Framework 
       
Shareholder 
Importance 
x3 x3   x 2    
Disclosure & 
Transparency 
       x 2 
Board’s 
Responsibilities  
       
Directors’ 
Performance 
       
Remuneration        
Auditor 
Independence 
       
Conflicts of 
Interest 
       
Company 
Oversight 
Board 
       
Corporate 
Fraud 
       
Penalties & 
Sentencing 
       
Ethical 
Decisions 
       
Risk 
Management 
       
Stakeholders        
 
The Governance Statement is a mechanism for an organisation “to demonstrate that their 
board and management are alive to the importance of having proper and effective corporate 
governance arrangements and to communicate to [their stakeholders] …the robustness of 
their particular approach to corporate governance” (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2014, p.9). Governance is the primary means by which a RAC declares that it meets its social 
responsibilities in relation to how organisations are directed and controlled. 
Within the governance statement, disclosure should also include information in relation to 
Board members for example qualification, experience, and other directorships. In Australia, 
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publicly listed companies according to listing rule 4.10 (ASIC Act 2001) must disclose a 
corporate governance statement outlining compliance with each of the governance principles 
as outlined in Table 1. Companies must disclose an ‘if not why not’ statement in relation to 
this disclosure. Any other entity in Australia that is not publicly listed does not need to 
disclose any governance information. 
The Australian RAC sector consists of 2,724 facilities of which are operated by 1,069 
providers across Australia during the 2011-12 financial year (ABS data collection period). 
This research involved an exhaustive search of the 1,069 RAC providers’ websites and other 
public electronic means of dissemination of their annual reports. Of the 1,069 RAC providers, 
only 197 publicly disclosed their annual report to their stakeholders. These 197 RAC 
providers accounted for 752 RAC facilities operating across Australia during the 2011-12 
ABS data collection period. Figure 1 further depicts the Australian RAC provider sample 
frame for this study. 
Figure 1: Australian RAC Provider Sample Data Set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community Based (50) 
Charitable (30)  
Religious (25) 
 
 
Private Inc. Bodies (4) 
Publicly Listed Co. (1) 
Government 
(87) 
RAC Providers 
(1,069) 
No publicly available 
Annual Report 
(872) 
Publicly available 
Annual Report 
(197) 
Removed from 
Sample Data Set 
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Figure 1 shows only one publicly listed company (out of the 197 that disclosed an annual 
report) that needs to disclose a governance statement, to comply with Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission legislation (ASIC Act 2001) which leads to the following 
research question: 
RQ: What is the level of disclosure and reporting of governance practices by Australian 
Residential Aged Care providers to stakeholders?    
 
3.0 Empirical Tests 
This study involved the researcher collecting, analysing, integrating and drawing inferences, 
from the data findings (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), using the quantitative approach. 
Quantitative research “is a formal, objective, systematic process in which numerical data are 
used to obtain information about the world” (Burns & Grove, 2005, p.23). 
This study investigates publicly available archival data and other disclosures of Australian 
RAC providers. Annual, financial and other reports of this study are examined over the 
period of three years (2013, 2014 and 2015), using archival data. During these three years the 
Australian Government introduced the Living Longer Living Better reforms which are 
“aimed at building a better and fairer aged care system” (AIHW, 2013); and the My Aged 
Care website, designed to improve the disclosure of aged care facilities by developing a 
central location for users to more easily access vital information in a timely manner.  
Traditionally, content analysis has been utilised to evaluate the extent, listed companies, 
disclose different items in annual reports (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 1995; 
Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Cowen Ferren & Parker, 1987; Guthrie & 
Mathews, 1985). That literature has been inclined to report the level of disclosure of certain 
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corporate governance initiatives. Those studies have often contrasted these elements with 
previous national or international research (Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006). 
The annual report has been the most widely utilised source for gathering governance 
information. However, there are other sources to gather this material, including; standalone 
reports and online material (website). Although researchers in governance have used other 
materials, an organisation’s annual report has remained the dominant source (Guthrie & 
Abeysekera, 2006). Here those sources are accessed. 
Table 2: Governance Data Collection 
Category Description of Process 
Director’s report 
(or equivalent) 
Search for the heading “Director’s report”, “Chairperson’s report”, 
“Chairman’s report”, or “Mayor’s report” 
Governance 
Statement 
Searched for word governance, then if they complied with 8 ASX 
recommendations 
Number of 
Directors 
Count number listed in annual report, financial report or own 
website 
 Males (title, name, picture or not enough information provided) 
 Females (title, name, picture or not enough information 
provided) 
Qualifications Full title of qualification or initials/abbreviation provided 
Experience One word or short description of director’s or member of council’s 
experience 
Other Directorships  Read each director’s profile to ascertain whether they list other 
directorships previously or currently held 
 
The data collected compared the level of disclosures between the different Australian RAC 
providers and across the three-year collection period. SPSS Statistical Software was 
employed to analyse the data using comparative and correlational analysis. 
 
4.0 Results 
Governance data were collated in relation to the number and percentage of RAC Providers 
that included their governance statement, Director’s report (or equivalent), board members’ 
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qualifications, experience and other directorships on other boards. This information was 
obtained from the RAC providers’ annual and/or financial reports, from the period of 2013 
through to 2015. Two statistical tests (comparative analysis and correlation analysis) were 
conducted using SPSS to determine the level of Governance Disclosure Australian RAC 
providers provide to their stakeholders. 
4.0.1 Comparative Analysis 
Table 3 presents a summary of the comparative statistical analysis of the RAC governance 
disclosure, averaged over the three-year period (2013-2015). 
Table 3: Summary of Comparative Statistical Analysis  
Governance Government 
(87) 
Privately Owned 
/Publicly Listed  
(5) 
Community 
/Religious  
(105) 
Governance Statement    
 Percentage 47.5% 66.7% 18.1% 
 Number 41 3 19 
Director’s Report (or equivalent)    
 Percentage 87.4% 80.0% 70.1% 
 Number 76 4 74 
Qualifications    
 Percentage 11.9% 6.7% 14.9% 
 Number 10 0.3 16 
Experience    
 Percentage 25.7% 53.3% 32.1% 
 Number 22 3 34 
Other Directorships    
 Percentage 2.7% 26.7% 3.2% 
 Number 2 1 3 
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4.0.1.1 Governance Statement 
When examining the overall disclosure of the governance statement according to the 
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government 
providers account for 47.5% (41 out of 87) of the corporate governance statement disclosed, 
the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 66.7% (3 out of 5) of the 
corporate governance statement disclosed, and the community and religious providers 
account for 18.1% (19 out of 105) of the corporate governance statement disclosed. Of those 
that disclosed the Government RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately 
owned/publicly listed or community/religious providers. 
 
4.0.1.2 Director’s Report (or equivalent)  
At often times the Director’s report was part of the Financial and/or Annual Report, at other 
times it was a standalone report. When examining the overall disclosure of the director’s 
report (or equivalent) according to the classification of the RAC organisations, on average 
over the three years, the government providers account for 87.4% (76 out of 87) of the 
director’s report (or equivalent) disclosed, the privately owned or publicly listed providers 
account for 80.0% (4 out of 5) of the director’s report (or equivalent) disclosed, and the 
community and religious providers account for 70.1% (74 out of 105) of the director’s report 
(or equivalent) disclosed. Of those that disclosed the Government and community/religious 
RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately owned/publicly listed 
providers. 
4.0.1.3 Qualifications  
When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ qualifications according to the 
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government 
providers account for 11.9% (10 out of 87) of the Board members’ qualifications disclosed, 
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the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 6.7% (0.3 out of 5) of the Board 
members’ qualifications disclosed, and the community and religious providers account for 
14.9% (16 out of 105) of the Board members’ qualifications disclosed. Of those that 
disclosed the community/religious RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the 
privately owned/publicly listed or Government providers. 
4.0.1.4 Experience 
When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ experience according to the 
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government 
providers account for 25.7% (22 out of 87) of the Board members’ experience disclosed, the 
privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 53.3% (3 out of 5) of the Board 
members’ experience disclosed, and the community and religious providers account for 
32.1% (34 out of 105) of the Board members’ experience disclosed. Of those that disclosed 
the community/religious RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately 
owned/publicly listed or Government providers. 
4.0.1.5 Other Directorships 
When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ other directorships on other 
boards according to the classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three 
years, the government providers account for 2.7% (2 out of 87) of the Board members’ other 
directorships disclosed, the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 26.7% (1 
out of 5) of the Board members’ other directorships disclosed, and the community and 
religious providers account for 3.2% (3 out of 105) of the Board members’ other 
directorships disclosed. Of those that disclosed there was no notable difference between the 
RAC Providers’ organisational classifications. 
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4.0.1.6 Board Characteristics 
The proportion of women that hold a position on the board of S&P/ASX200 Group (top 200 
companies) is 18% in 2013 and 15% in 2012 (KPMG, 2014, p.27). The percentage of women 
board members in this sample on average is 33%. This therefore indicates that this sector 
(RAC) as a whole are performing better in terms of gender equality in board representation 
(could be representative of this sector). This could also be representative of the number of 
female appointed not-for-profit board members, whom gain initial experience on a not-for-
profit board before progressing to a for-profit or publicly listed company board (paid board 
positions as opposed to voluntary not-for-profit position). 
4.0.2 Correlation Analysis 
The Governance disclosure results reported in Table 4 indicates a significant positive 
relationship between the RAC provider’s organisational classification and their disclosure of 
their Governance statement (0.332) and director’s report (0.270). This indicates that these 
variables are significantly correlated in this sample; meaning as the level of governance 
disclosure increases, the RAC’s disclosure of their governance statement and director’s report 
also increase. These results also reveal a significant positive correlation between the RAC 
provider’s governance statement and the disclosure of their director’s report (0.222). 
Therefore, as the level of disclosure of their governance statement increases, so does the level 
of disclosure of their director’s report. However, this has the opposite effect on the disclosure 
of their other directorships of their board members (-0.163).  
In addition, these findings reveal a significant negative association between the disclosure of 
their director’s report and their other directorships of their board members (-0.214). These 
results also indicate a significant negative correlation between the director’s qualifications 
and their experience (-0.224). Therefore, as the level of disclosure of their director’s 
qualifications decreases, so does the level of disclosure of their experience. However, this has 
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the opposite effect on the disclosure of their other directorships of their board members 
(0.221). These results further indicate a significant negative relationship between the 
director’s experience and their other directorships of their board members (-0.398).  
Table 4: Pearson’s Correlation of Social Disclosure and RAC Classification 
Governance Organisational 
Classification 
Governance 
Statement 
Director’s 
Report  
Director’s 
Qualifications 
 
Director’s 
Experience 
Other 
Directorships 
Organisational 
Classification 
      
Governance 
Statement 
0.332**      
0.000      
Director’s 
Report (or 
equivalent) 
0.270** 0.222**     
0.000 0.002     
Director’s 
Qualifications  
-0.014 -0.035 -0.063    
0.840 0.621 0.376    
Director’s 
Experience 
-0.096 0.030 0.079 -0.224**   
0.178 0.678 0.267 0.002   
Other 
Directorships 
0.106 -0.163* -0.214** 0.221** -0.398**  
0.137 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.000  
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
(2-tailed) 
 
5.0 Summary and Conclusions  
The results indicated a significant association between each of the governance variables and 
their level of disclosure. Meaning that there was a strong positive relationship between the 
RAC providers’ level of governance disclosure.  
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Overall, the results indicated that the sample Australian RAC providers, disclosed their board 
composition to varying degrees. However, there is no formal governance report. The RAC 
providers tended to disclose their governance in either their annual report, separate finance 
report and/or on their individual websites providing varying degrees of detail.  
Conclusion the RAC Sector disclosure and reporting of governance could be enhanced by a 
specific RAC Sector Governance Framework.  
The RAC Sector Governance Framework (Figure 2) illustrates the key elements that combine 
to form the Governance section grouped within the Social Disclosure part of the RAC 
Sector’s annual reporting. The RAC Sector Governance Disclosure should incorporate their 
Governance Statement, Director’s report (or equivalent), organisational characteristics and 
Board characteristics. 
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Figure 2: RAC Sector Governance Framework 
 
 
 
Following on from the RAC Sector Governance Framework (Figure 2), the RAC Sector 
Governance Principles will be further detailed, these are specific RAC Sector principles 
based on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX, 2014) recommendations and other 
research. This model presented below will be known as the G-CARD (Governance Checklist 
Aged Residential Disclosure), this will enable RAC Sector organisations to assess what 
governance information they are currently disclosing, but more importantly what governance 
information they need to disclose to stakeholders to help them make more informed 
decisions. 
Qualifications 
Experience 
Other 
Directorship
s 
Length of 
Service 
Subcommittees 
Risk 
Management 
Stakeholder 
Management 
Disclosure 
& 
Transparency Ethics 
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The G-CARD (Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure) 
The RAC Governance Framework is outlined in Table 5. This framework has been adapted to 
reflect the relevant recommended principles that the RAC sector should aim to adhere. 
Table 5: G-CARD (Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure) 
 Governance 
Principles 
Recommendations Yes No 
  X 
1 Board Culture Size – The number of members on the Board should abide by the entity’s 
bylaws. 
Composition – The composition of the Board, where applicable and 
appropriate, should be diverse with respect to disability, gender, culture, 
experience and skills, in line with the entity’s strategic objectives and 
goals. 
Roles and Responsibility – The roles, expectations and legal 
responsibilities of the Board should be clearly defined, understood and 
respected. The Board roles and responsibilities should be set out in the 
entity’s constitution. 
Performance Evaluation – The performance of the Board and overall 
quality of governance should be reviewed, assessed and monitored, to 
ensure all activities are aligned with the entity’s vision, mission, 
purpose, strategies and objectives. 
 
2 Board 
Members 
Experience – Ensure Board member are transparent in relation to their 
past and present experience. 
Qualifications – Ensure all Board members disclose their qualifications 
and skills. 
Other Board Memberships – Ensure all Board members disclose any 
previous board memberships, positions and/or experience. 
Length of Service – The commencement and end date of all Board 
members should disclosed to their stakeholders in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
Sub-committees (remuneration, audit, nomination, risk) – Transparent 
disclosure of all Board sub-committees, outlining the members of the 
committees and attendance. 
 
3 Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
This information should pertain to: 
Non-financial Information – Disclosure of the entity’s vision statement, 
mission statement, objectives and strategies; 
Financial Information – Disclosure of the entity’s Comprehensive 
Statement of Comprehensive Income, Statement of Financial Position, 
Cash Flow Statement, Statement of Changes in Equity/funds (where 
applicable), Notes to Financial Statements, Audit information, and any 
other pertinent information (such as ratio analysis); and  
Social Information – Disclosure of the entity’s governance (Governance 
Statement and/or director’s report, Board composition and Board 
characteristics) and Sustainability activities (Sustainability report). 
 
4 Stakeholders Consultancy – The entity should actively consult and encourage 
stakeholder engagement, to ensure effective, transparent, equitable and 
accurate communication and participation. 
 
5 Ethics and 
Risk 
Management 
Code of Conduct – Ensure the entity has a formal code of conduct, 
values and behaviours.  
Reputation – Ensure the entity operates in an ethical and sustainable 
manner, with respect to the community in which the entity operates 
within. 
Risk Management -  Ensure risk management systems are in place to 
mitigate and manage risks 
 
Source: Adapted from ASX Corporate Governance Council, (2014); McNamara (n.d.); Not For Profit 
Compliance Support Centre (2013, November 21). 
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This research answers the following research question: RQ: What is the level of disclosure 
and reporting of governance practices by Australian Residential Aged Care providers to 
stakeholders? This leads to the following conclusion: Conclusion the RAC Sector disclosure 
and reporting of governance could be enhanced by using a specific RAC Sector Governance 
Framework and use of the G-CARD Model to identify governance needs.  
There can be little doubt that would be residents, their relatives and those acting on their 
behalf, would like to be able to choose which aged care facility best meets the financial and 
care positions of their relatives and loved ones. There is equally no doubt that those who run 
such aged care facilities are in the best position to provide such information. But, the analysis 
which has preceded above indicates that they generally have failed to do so. The Governance 
Framework and Principles were developed to address this lack of adequate and consistent 
disclosure in the Australian RAC Sector. 
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